Guidelines for CPTED
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design for Licensed Premises

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New Zealand POLICE
Nga Pirihimana O Aotearoa

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Contents

Introduction

These guidelines have been developed by the Health Promotion Agency (HPA) to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in all licensed premises. The guidelines should assist those involved in the design, development and refurbishment of licensed premises, as well as those wishing to implement their principles in existing premises. While the best time to consider such issues is at an early stage in the design process, even at an advanced stage it can be possible to make minor changes which can make a positive impact.

The main aim is to reduce opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour both in and around licensed premises and in doing so, enhance the safety of customers and staff as well as the security of the buildings and facilities.

Aims and objectives

- to raise awareness of crime prevention and safety, and their relationship to the environment in and around licensed premises
- to promote the value of crime prevention design in licensed premises
- to continue to improve the standards in licensed premises.

The guidelines are not intended to be prescriptive and the recommended actions should be interpreted to meet those risks specific to each type of licensed premises. They focus on key issues to consider in relation to the needs of each local setting. It is also important to note that the guidelines seek to address the design of licensed premises only and do not address the management of the premises. However, responsible management is crucial to delivering a safe drinking environment.

These guidelines supplement the Ministry of Justice's National Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in New Zealand, (2005).

Why do we need the guidelines?

Crime and the fear of crime are real and important issues for people in New Zealand (Ministry of Justice, 2005). They affect people's quality of life – people may avoid going out at night or stay away from particular areas because of their fear of crime. This in turn has important economic consequences as people choose to avoid certain retail and entertainment areas in favour of those that are safer or perceived as safer.

There is a general acceptance that the design of buildings and their surroundings are major factors affecting crime and, in particular, alcohol-related disorder (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2005). It is recognised that certain elements in the design of licensed premises can promote or dissuade criminal behaviour at or near licensed premises and also assist the ability of a licensee to exercise control over their premises. The principles recommended in these guidelines seek to reduce or eliminate risks through the design or redesign of a licensed premises and the immediate surrounding area.

Evidence shows that 6,957 offences were recorded nationally in 2013 as occurring on premises licensed for the sale of alcohol, including on-, off- and club-licensed premises (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). Although since 2009 there has been a gradual decline in the number of recorded offences, they remain significantly high. The recorded offences included robbery, theft, assault, harassment and property damage. Two homicides were recorded on licensed premises for each of the years 2007–2009 and one in 2012.

For those recorded offences on licensed premises, alcohol may or may not have been consumed by the offender. However, during 2007–2008, for all recorded offences where the offender had consumed alcohol, 11% of all offences occurred in commercial settings, 42% of which were on licensed premises (New Zealand Police, 2009).

National annual recorded offences in licensed premises

Who are the guidelines for?

Regulatory agencies

The Police, licensing inspectors and Public Health Services all have a responsibility in reducing alcohol-related harm; ensuring licensed premises comply with licensing requirements and improving standards in licensed premises in general. This includes working with licensees to reduce aggression, assault, violence and crime in licensed premises. When licensing premises for the sale and supply of alcohol, the regulatory agencies are particularly interested in premises with a history of anti-social behaviour. The Police are further tasked with reducing crime in general.

Licensees

Licensees have a responsibility not to allow anti-social behaviour in licensed premises. It is also in their own interest to reduce aggression, assault, violence and crime in their premises for personal safety, financial security and in generally making the premises more attractive to customers.

Safety planners

Safety planners are interested in the wider aspects of reducing crime across their region including in and around licensed premises.

Security providers

Door staff and other security providers are tasked with monitoring and enforcement of alcohol licensing requirements such as preventing intoxication and the illegal presence of minors, as well as dealing with aggression and violence in licensed premises.

Alcohol accords and alcohol licensing/liaison groups

Alcohol accords and alcohol licensing/liaison groups work together to reduce problems associated with alcohol across a designated area(s). This includes assault, violence and crime in and around licensed premises.

The Police, licensing inspectors and Public Health Services all have a responsibility in reducing alcohol-related harm.

Background

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a well researched crime prevention method which has been shown to reduce opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour (Queensland Government, 2007). It provides positive community safety benefits by improving planning and design decisions in ways that provide organisations, communities and businesses with practical crime prevention tools. The fundamental idea of CPTED is that it is possible to use knowledge and creativity to design built environments in ways that lessen or prevent the incidence of crime.

What is CPTED?

C R Jeffrey's Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (1971) introduced a new era in criminological thought centred on the environment surrounding a crime rather than the criminal. It is he who is credited with first using the term 'CPTED'. Jeffrey, a criminologist, was supported by architect Oscar Newman with his Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design (1972) in which he highlighted the physical design ingredients of territoriality and surveillance as contributing to a secure environment, both internally and externally.

CPTED is an acronym for crime prevention through environmental design which asserts that 'the proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life' (Crowe, 2000). It is a crime prevention philosophy based on proper design and effective use of the built environment leading to a reduction in the incidence and fear of crime, as well as an improvement in quality of life (Ministry of Justice, 2005). CPTED reduces criminal opportunity and fosters positive social interaction among legitimate users of space. The emphasis is on prevention rather than apprehension and punishment. It is an advanced approach and is being implemented on a global scale (Cozens et al., 2005).

CPTED provides three approaches to managing the physical environment in ways that will reduce the opportunity for crime (Ministry of Justice, 2005):

- Natural – the integration of security and behavioural concepts into how human and physical resources are designed and used (e.g. border definition, windows)
- Organised – the introduction of labour-intensive security (e.g. guards, police, security patrols)
- Mechanical – the introduction of capital or hardware-intensive security (e.g. locks, closed circuit television, lighting).

As a result of these approaches, there are four key overlapping CPTED principles (Ministry of Justice, 2005):

1. Surveillance – people are present and can see what is going on
2. Access management – methods are used to attract people and vehicles to some places and restrict them from others
3. Territorial reinforcement – clear boundaries encourage community ownership of the space
4. Quality environments – good quality, well maintained places attract people and support surveillance.

The four principles of CPTED[1]

How might physical features influence behaviour? Offenders often operate in a rational fashion (National Institute of Justice, 1996). They prefer to commit crimes that require the least effort, provide the highest rewards and pose the lowest risks. This view suggests that crimes are most likely to occur when potential offenders come into contact with a suitable crime target where the chances of detection by others are thought to be low or the criminal, if detected, will be able to exit without being identified or apprehended. In short, the crime site lacks a natural guardian.

Physical environment features can influence the chances of a crime occurring. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more natural guardians at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following (National Institute of Justice, 1996):

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

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1   Adapted from National Guidelines for Crime Prevention through Environmental Design in New Zealand – Part 1: Seven Qualities of Safer Places. (Ministry of Justice, 2005).

What are the benefits of CPTED?

The theory of crime prevention through environmental design is based on one simple idea – that crime results partly from the opportunities presented by the physical environment (Clarke, 2002). This being the case it should be possible to alter the physical environment so that crime is less likely to occur.

The overarching main benefits of adopting a CPTED approach are (Ministry of Justice, 2005):

1. Safety and security are essential to successful communities

Successful communities are places where people live, work and enjoy life in the knowledge that they can do so safely. Places that are safe and feel safe are vibrant and attract people, activity and investment.

2. Safe design enhances the quality of the environment

Safe design not only enhances public safety, it also adds to the attractiveness and use of the environment. Many safe design principles reinforce fundamental principles of good urban design. Safe design can improve the quality of the environment in many ways.

3. Planning for safety makes sense financially

Integrating safety at the outset of a development's design brings long-term social and economic benefits. Getting it right first time saves future costs of correcting or managing badly designed development. Safe popular places with high pedestrian counts are better for business, reflected in higher turnover, employment, profit, rents, capital values and rates.

4. Integrated planning makes a significant contribution to tackling crime

Good design alone cannot be expected to solve crime. However, considered positive planning, particularly when co-ordinated with other measures, can make a significant contribution to safety. Taking an integrated approach to each development, where professional disciplines and key stakeholders work together, is important.

Good design of licensed premises can make a significant contribution to reducing the likelihood of disorder or criminal activities.

There is a growing body of research that supports the assertion that crime prevention through environmental design is effective in reducing both crime and fear of crime in the community (Cozens et al., 2005). A review of the effectiveness of CPTED in reducing robberies (Casteel & Peek-Asa, 2000) found that of the 16 intervention programs evaluated, all 16 interventions experienced a percentage reduction in robberies ranging from 30–84% fewer robberies.

While the strongest tool in preventing disorder is alert and firm management, good design of licensed premises can make a significant contribution to reducing the likelihood of disorder or criminal activities (Portman Group, 2000).

The hospitality industry is vibrant, dynamic and continually changing to meet the aspirations of contemporary consumers (British Beer and Pub Association & Metropolitan Police, 2003). Nowhere is this truer than in bars where feeling relaxed and safe is vital to customers and staff. Security, therefore, is a vital element in any professionally run outlet.

Licensed premises and CPTED

The broad nature of the CPTED approach allows its adaptation to any setting including licensed premises.

There is no single design formula that can be applied to all licensed premises as every location should be looked at as a unique site. But there are certain principles that need to be considered in all cases such as the trading style, typical patronage, location and basic physical features of the premises (Portman Group, 2000). Also, with the increasing trend towards providing drinking areas outside the premises e.g. tables on the pavement, it is important to try to use a consistent approach inside and out.

Designing licensed premises

The aim when designing licensed premises should be (Portman Group, 2000):

- To meet reasonable customer expectations
- To achieve an optimal balance in terms of stimulation
- To provide an environment that maximises ease of monitoring and management
- To avoid creating spaces that serve as 'poser platforms' for macho display

The environment contributing to the aggression

It is well accepted that characteristics of a bar itself can increase the risk of violence by providing situations and conditions that promote aggressive behaviour (Quigley et al., 2003). Characteristics of a bar that may promote violence can be categorised as either physical or social in nature. Physical characteristics associated with negative effects such as high temperatures, poor lighting and ventilation, noise etc. have been found to be related to bar violence (Graham et al., 1980). These and other physical characteristics increase the likelihood of aggression by creating an environment in which individuals are more likely to come into conflict. Crowding around the bar area creates the risk of accidental bumping and irritation and can also lead to conflict (Scott & Dedel, 2006).

Specific factors that have been linked to a higher likelihood of aggression in licensed premises include (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2010):

- Crowding
- Poor bar layout and traffic flow
- Inadequate seating or inconvenient bar access
- Dim lighting, noise, poor ventilation or unclean conditions
- Discount drinks and promotions that encourage excessive consumption (e.g. happy hours)
- Lack of availability of food
- A 'permissive' environment that turns a blind eye to anti-social behaviour
- Patrons with a history of aggression and who binge drink
- Bar workers who do not practice responsible serving
- Aggression/intimidation by door and security staff

Factors of aggression

The potential for these features to be problematic is heightened when they co-exist with the consumption of alcohol, as occurs in licensed premises (Doherty & Roche, 2003). For example, licensed premises are often associated with crowding. Crowding increases the chance of accidental contact and alcohol affects the ability of individuals to appropriately deal with this contact. Poor bar layout and design within crowded premises increases the potential for aggression to occur (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2010).

Frustration arises when customers are prevented from doing what they want or getting what they expected to and if triggered in some way, can result in aggression (Portman Group, 2000). Frustration is often directly linked to design factors, including insufficient bar serving areas; poor lay-out; inappropriate temperatures, sound and light levels; poor-quality fittings that are easily damaged; and fittings in toilets that are easily vandalised or damaged. The solutions to many of these problems can be simple and cost-effective.

Dilapidated decor, seating in rows and poor lighting have also been identified as factors which increase the risk of physical aggression in licensed premises (Graham & Homel, 2008). A comfortable and entertaining atmosphere reduces both frustration and boredom among patrons, which can reduce aggression levels. Furthermore, attractive, well-maintained bars suggest to patrons that the owners care about their property and will not tolerate disorderly and violent conduct that might destroy it (Deehan, 2004).

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CPTED strategies for on- and club-licensed premises

The selection and implementation of the following strategies will depend on:

• the perceived hazard, risk and likelihood of incidents arising

• the persons at risk

• the value of property at risk

• the cost of installing recommended measures, and

• the likely reduction in risk.

Bar area

The level of the floor behind the bar counter is a significant factor to consider. This has the effect of raising staff above customers, making them appear more imposing and in control. It also makes it easier for staff to see customers who are waiting to be served; provides a better vantage point from which to spot potential problems; and provides a safer environment for bar staff. Viewing from the bar should be maximised by not closing down the space with glass racks, low canopies, screens, pillars etc.

A further issue is the practice of suspending glasses above the bar. While the intention may be to enable the staff to maintain eye contact with a customer while selecting a glass, poor design can result in customers being able to reach glasses for use as weapons.

Cash registers should be positioned away from customers' reach. Registers fronting customers are preferable as they enable staff to maintain vision of the serving area and beyond. If they are placed rear facing, mirrors can be installed to facilitate staff monitoring. Any safes on the premises should be positioned out of public view.

Internal layout

There is a basic design conflict between the need of licensees and their staff to be able to monitor the behaviour of customers and the preference of many customers for a secluded area for themselves and their friends. Open-plan designs often meet the needs of the licensee but fail to satisfy customers. Optimal designs may include an open-plan space that is divided in such a way that groups of customers are visually, or psychologically, separated but the licensee and staff can monitor the activities of everyone in the bar. The devices used to achieve such separation can include solid partitions where they do not obstruct the licensee's view, trellis or mesh partitions where blind spots would otherwise be created and differentiated lighting effects.

Where blind spots are inevitable, many licensees and their staff favour the use of carefully positioned decorative mirrors rather than more obvious security devices. However, closed circuit television (CCTV) with a monitor behind the bar is also an option which is increasingly used. If separate rooms or mezzanine floors are provided, the use of CCTV is even more important to consider.

The anticipated flow of customers within the premises is a significant element. Customers must be able to approach the bar and return to their seats with the minimum of physical contact with others, especially those who are seated. Flows to and from toilets should similarly be unobstructed. By reducing the potential for jostling, spillage of drinks, etc., many sources of conflict and aggression can be avoided from the outset.

Example of raised bar area

Example of good internal layout

Research shows (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2005) that bars that are primarily dedicated to 'vertical' (i.e. stand up) drinking are more likely to generate problems of drunkenness and assaults. An imbalance of standing areas over seating areas is therefore discouraged. There should be no design features that allow climbing and access to potentially more vulnerable parts of the premises.

See Appendix 1: *Examples of On-licence bar layouts.*

Crowding

Crowding contributes directly and indirectly to alcohol-related aggression and violence in licensed venues. A number of factors contribute to aggression and violence including accidental contact between patrons, and also increases in temperature and noise within the premises. Patrons drink more alcohol to overcome discomfort associated with crowding and increased consumption can lead to a lowered tolerance to social and environmental irritants. Crowding also interferes with the ability of staff to monitor for intoxicated patrons.

The maximum number of patrons for licensed premises is determined primarily by territorial authorities in accordance with the Building Act 2004. Imposing an upper limit on patron numbers is intended to limit or reduce the negative effects of crowding such as intoxicated frustration and aggression. It also helps emergency service personnel to manage emergency incidents and facilitates safe exit from the premises. Door staff play a key role in regulating patron numbers. They should regulate entry and exit points in maintaining control over patron numbers.

Example of poor lighting

Lighting

Internal lighting

Lighting in licensed premises can play a significant role in creating the right atmosphere. Extremes of lighting, e.g. too bright or too dim should be avoided. Very bright lighting is cold and unwelcoming, and can create irritation for customers. Whereas, lighting which is too dim makes it difficult for bar and security staff to monitor the behaviour of customers effectively, particularly for the signs of intoxication and the checking of IDs.

In the section on layout, the need to break up large, open areas into smaller units was noted. Directional lighting, which creates pools of light interspersed with less brightly lit areas, can help to achieve the effect of divisions.

Installing dimmer switches increases control of areas from behind the bar. An override allows, in the case of an incident occurring, the lighting level to be raised and is an important element of control. This will also assist at the end of trading such that patrons are easily made aware that the premises are closing.

External lighting

Lighting levels should be appropriate for the users, activities and tasks of an external area. In areas outside licensed venues such as alleyways etc., good quality lighting discourages loitering thereby reducing congregations of people who may engage in conflict, noise, disorderly behaviour and criminal offending. The objective of security

lighting is to deny offenders the advantage of being able to operate unobserved. However, if an area cannot be overlooked or viewed at night, then lighting will only help an offender see what they are doing, rather than deter them. In this case other security measures will be required such as CCTV, or the monitoring of the area by security staff. Higher lighting levels may be required for more vulnerable areas.

Example of unlit rear of a bar

Ventilation

Poor ventilation and inefficient air-conditioning contribute to the amount of heat in a drinking location. Heat exacerbates physical discomfort, which heightens irritation and also leads to increased alcohol consumption. The consequence is increased risk of intoxication, aggression, social disruption and violence. Therefore, the premises should be well ventilated with effective climate control to prevent the premises from becoming too hot (or too cold).

Outdoor drinking areas

The consumption of alcohol needs to be properly controlled in outdoor drinking areas as well as inside the licensed premises. In many cases outdoor drinking areas cannot be seen by staff working behind the bar. Consequently proper monitoring of patrons in these areas should be carried out frequently by bar and/or security staff. There should be suitable lighting to allow staff to monitor the behaviour of the customers. CCTV may be installed to assist with such monitoring as well as to deter misbehaviour (see CCTV).

The siting of furniture and screens should be carefully considered so as not to cause an obstruction to the flow of customers within the outdoor drinking areas and thereby reduce the potential for conflict and aggression.

The interface of the outdoor drinking area with the immediate surrounding environment should be properly managed. It is important to avoid 'pavement creep' so as to reduce the potential for conflict between patrons and pedestrians. Boundaries and interconnecting spaces adjacent to the premises need to be properly managed and there should be clear border definition between pavement drinking/dining areas and the public footpath.

Example of a well designed outdoor drinking area

Example of good demarcation of outdoor drinking area

Example of poor demarcation of outdoor drinking area

Example of CCTV surveillance at the entrance/exit of a bar

Drinking must be contained in outdoor areas that are part of the licensed premises and overcrowding should be avoided to ensure this occurs. Overcrowding should also be avoided so as to reduce the likelihood of alcohol-related aggression and violence (see Crowding).

In most cases, a street trading licence or equivalent issued by the local council is required for outdoor dining and drinking. It will specify its own requirements such as maintaining a minimum unobstructed pedestrian clear-way and the siting of furniture and screens, etc.

For more information on general areas surrounding licensed premises, see the Ministry of Justice's National Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in New Zealand – Part 1: Seven Qualities of Safer Places, (2005), available at www.justice.govt.nz.

CCTV

In the last decade, CCTV technology has improved enormously and has become cheaper and easier to use. While highly sophisticated systems are still expensive and so, realistically, are only available to public authorities or major businesses, small business owners and even individuals can now install and use basic CCTV systems with ease. The result is that CCTV is now commonplace in New Zealand. However, the use of CCTV needs to be carefully thought through in terms of what is wanted from the system, e.g. if its purpose is to deter then it should be highly visible but if it is to provide intelligence for identification purposes then it should be more discreet.

It is particularly useful for observing areas that cannot be easily or naturally observed within and around licensed premises. This acts as a deterrent to misbehaviour, particularly where the public is aware that they are monitored and action may be taken for deviance disclosed via this medium.

CCTV can:

- Increase the accountability of security staff and others
- Assist in identifying offenders
- Provide evidence of violence occurring in and around the premises
- Provide evidence of any other serious crimes occurring in or involving people at the premises
- Assist in identifying physical hazards and guide improved premises design.

It is important that staff understand how to operate the equipment and how to view and download footage. Because CCTV captures images of people, which can be used, stored, manipulated and disseminated, those who operate the systems need to be aware of how to manage privacy issues. Good management of personal information is essential to the effective running of CCTV systems.

For more information, see Appendix 4: *Privacy and CCTV*.

Example of poor entranceway to a nightclub

Entrances and exits

Consideration given to the positioning and number of entry and exit points is an important part of reducing opportunities for crime. It allows bar and security staff to monitor who is entering and leaving the premises. Entrances including emergency exits should be easily viewed from behind the bar or serving area. If this is not possible, use of CCTV should be considered to monitor blind spots. It may be best to minimise the number of entrances although this must be in accordance with fire safety requirements. Where door staff are used, space should be provide for them so as to avoid congestion in the doorways which can lead to conflict. This area should be covered with good lighting to assess those entering and leaving. Where customers may need to queue to gain access to the premises, there should be sufficient space so as those queuing do not obstruct the footpath or other local businesses.

Toilets

Toilet facility entrances should be clearly visible from the bar. Where this is not possible, compensatory factors such as CCTV can be incorporated. There are three types of toilet entrance: totally separate male and female facilities; entrance to male and female facilities next to each other; and shared entrance with separate doors to each facility behind the first entrance. The third type is most difficult to control and CCTV may be considered.

Staff

To prevent alcohol-related problems, including violence, a shift in thinking is required from considering offenders and their motivations to understanding offences and the settings in which they occur. In the case of licensed premises, this requires a focus on the role of internal management practices that contribute to unsafe and problematic environments.

Effective management of licensed premises involves the following:

- There are sufficient numbers of staff, particularly management and security staff, to manage the volume of people and any potential problems
- There are sufficient numbers of bar staff to avoid customer frustration in waiting to be served
- Staff are visible and accessible to patrons in need of assistance
- Staff are proactive in encouraging patrons to seek assistance if they experience offensive or aggressive behaviour. This may include signage encouraging customers to report any bad behaviour.
- Staff are trained to deal with complaints positively rather than dismiss them.

Security staff may be a positive or negative factor in the incidence and severity of harm arising from aggression and violence. A number of studies have found that security staff contribute to a high proportion of violent incidents (Doherty & Roche, 2003). They were witnessed either creating violence, using excessive physical force, shifting the problem to the street and observing or participating in the continuance of violence.

Security staff should therefore be properly trained and certified for their role and possess good conflict resolution and crowd control skills.

See Appendix 3: *CPTED checklist for on- and club-licensed premises.*

CPTED strategies for off-licensed premises

The selection and implementation of the following strategies will depend on:

- quick and ready access to cash and stock
- quick 'surprise' access to the premises and a speedy means of escape
- minimal chance that the robbery will be observed
- minimal chance of being detected and identified.

The overall benefits of a CPTED approach in off-licensed premises include:

- increased personal safety of staff and customers
- a reduced risk of robbery and loss of finance
- a reduced risk of being targeted for other types of crime such as shoplifting
- a brighter and more visible store is more inviting for customers.

Windows

Robbers prefer to work unobserved. Improving the visibility into the premises from outside reduces the risk for robbery. People walking by should see as much of the premises' interior as possible. There should be at least 50% transparency in the front of the premises so there is good visibility to and from the premises and the street. Reducing the number of advertising signs on windows and keeping windows clear of shelving and displays increases visibility. There should be clear lines of sight into and out of the premises from surrounding areas. Any external trees and plants should be kept trimmed so as not to impede visibility into and out of the premises.

Example of good visibility into store

Lighting

Transition lighting and awning lighting ensure customers can see and be seen when entering and leaving the premises. Installing bright lighting inside the premises assists with being seen from outside on the street as well as improving visibility of customers inside the premises. Internal lighting which is too dim makes it difficult for staff to monitor for the signs of intoxication and the checking of IDs.

In outside areas good quality lighting discourages loitering thereby reducing congregations of people who may engage in conflict, disorderly behaviour and criminal offending. The objective of security lighting is to deny offenders the advantage of being able to operate unobserved. However, if an area cannot be overlooked or viewed at night, then lighting will only help an offender see what they are doing, rather than deter them. In this case other security measures will be required such as CCTV. External areas such as car parks, rear loading areas, etc. should be well lit, and street lighting outside the premises working properly.

Example of obstructed visibility into store

Example of good entrance and internal lighting

Example of poor internal lighting

Example of good visibility of interior of store

Internal layout

The cash register and staff should be positioned to ensure good control over the premises. The counter and cash register are best positioned near the entrance to allow staff to monitor who is entering and leaving premises. The cash register should however be positioned so as to reduce visibility of the amount of cash in the drawer. Any safes on the premises should be positioned out of public view.

Raising the platform behind the service counter gives staff a better view of the interior of the premises and shelving/displays, as well as the exterior of the premises and the street outside. No stock displays should be higher than 1.3m so as not to cause blind spots so that the cashier can always see customers in the store. Internal open space design with divisions will also reduce blind spots and assist with the use of CCTV. Cold stores should have clear glass frontage and low displays to give clear visibility of potential shoplifting. Where blind spots are inevitable, the use of carefully positioned mirrors and/or CCTV with a monitor behind the bar is an option which is increasingly used.

See Appendix 2: *Examples of off-licence store layouts.*

Example of cash register near entrance

Security

The use of roller shutters detracts from the visual appearance of the premises and should be avoided. These can also attract graffiti. If graffiti or tagging occurs, it is prudent to remove this as soon as possible (within 24 hours) since its rapid removal has proven to be the best deterrent in combating graffiti and it sends a clear message that graffiti will not be tolerated. Some councils offer a free removal service. In some cases, doors and windows may be reinforced with interior screens and anti-shatter film or laminated glass. Anything which may facilitate loitering in front of the premises, e.g. recessed front entrances, notice boards, etc. should be avoided.

The installation of an intruder alarm with an associated silent panic/duress facility can immediately alert the alarm monitoring centre of an armed robbery. A panic button positioned in the cold store is also good practice should an offender restrain an employee there. Integrating the intruder alarm with premises lighting, such that when the alarm activates, the lights come on automatically can have the effect of driving the offenders out, as well as improving the quality of CCTV images captured.

Example of roller shutters

Example of CCTV monitor

CCTV

In the last decade, CCTV technology has improved enormously and has become cheaper and easier to use. While highly sophisticated systems are still expensive and so, realistically, are only available to public authorities or major businesses, small business owners and even individuals can now install and use basic CCTV systems with ease. The result is that CCTV is now commonplace in New Zealand.

The use of CCTV in off-licensed premises is encouraged as part of an overall crime prevention strategy. Making its use highly visible will deter a robber, as well as assist with their detection and identification should a robbery occur.

CCTV can:

• Increase the accountability of staff

• Assist in identifying offenders

• Provide evidence of other crimes occurring

• Assist in identifying physical hazards and guide improved premises design

It is important that staff understand how to operate the equipment and how to view and download footage. Because CCTV captures images of people, which can be used, stored, manipulated and disseminated, those who operate the systems need to be aware of how to manage privacy issues. Good management of personal information is essential to the effective running of CCTV systems.

For more information, see Appendix 4: *Privacy and CCTV*.

Example of CCTV at rear of premises

Staff

There should be a sufficient number of staff to ensure control of the premises. Having two or more workers on the premises after dark can deter an offender from committing a crime. Staff should be immediately visible to customers upon entering the store. Having staff greet (i.e. acknowledge) customers as they enter the store, advises any potential offenders that they have been seen and are being watched. The use of a door buzzer alerts staff to someone entering or leaving the store, particularly if staff are not at the checkout.

See Appendix 3: *CPTED checklist for on- and club-licensed premises*.

General requirements of an effective strategy

The following responses provide a foundation of ideas for the implementation of strategies to address the problem:[2]

1. Enlisting community support

Broad-based coalitions that incorporate the interests of the community and other local licensed premises are recommended. Alcohol Accords are an important media to promote responsible premises management. These incorporate the interests of bar owners, as well as community members, regularly coming together to discuss incidents that have occurred in the local area, and to jointly craft solutions. While recruiting members can be difficult, the key is to keep all parties motivated and actively involved for extended periods. All parties should come to accept ownership for the problem, and for responses to it.

2. Implementing multifaceted, comprehensive strategies

Multifaceted, comprehensive strategies are more effective than those that address only one or a few of the conditions that increase the risks of aggression and violence. Any response should address as many known risk factors as possible, rather than focusing on the contributions of alcohol alone.

3. Getting cooperation and support from bar owners and managers

It is important to secure the cooperation and involvement of all licensed premises in the area to guard against merely moving the problem somewhere else, and against losing the support of owners who feel unfairly targeted. Bar owners should agree on policies and establish ways to enforce them. Rogue bar owners can easily undermine these agreements by refusing to follow such policies. This creates pressure on other operators to do likewise.

4. Informally monitoring bar policies and practices

It is important to use voluntary safety audits and risk assessments to identify high-risk locations and conditions. Monitoring systems should use data to measure effectiveness.

5. Enforcing relevant alcohol licensing laws

In addition to the implementation of a CPTED approach within licensed premises, the responsible management and proper enforcement of alcohol licensing laws are crucial in delivering a safe drinking environment. Providing a safe drinking environment is the overall aim of host responsibility.

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2   Adapted from Assaults in and Around Bars. (Scott & Dedel, 2006).

# Appendix 1: Examples of on- and club licence bar layouts

Example of a poorly designed bar

- The bar area is obstructed by bar stools, and tables and chairs positioned close by it. Customers will have difficulty being seen and getting served
- The entrance to the toilets is obstructed and difficult to access. It cannot be seen by bar staff
- The layout of the premises does not provide an unobstructed flow for customers
- Bar staff have a limited view of the premises
- Entrances A & B cannot be monitored by bar staff as their view is obstructed by partitions C & D
- There are blind spots in areas behind partitions C & D
- There is no use of mirrors to assist with blind spots
- There is no CCTV installed
- There is no room for door staff to operate inside both entrances

Example of a well designed bar

- The bar area is clear and customers can be easily seen and served
- The entrance to the toilets is clear, easy to access and can be seen by bar staff
- The layout of the premises provides an unobstructed flow for customers
- The bar area is raised and bar staff have an unobstructed view of the premises
- Entrances A & B can be seen from the bar area by bar staff and are easily monitored
- There are no blind spots in the premises
- Mirrors assist bar staff when facing away from customers
- CCTV is installed
- Staff can move freely through the premises to monitor for intoxication
- There is room for door staff to operate inside both entrances

Appendix 2: Examples of off-licence store layouts

Example of a poorly designed store

- A person entering the premises at site A cannot be seen by the cashier and has a good view of the entire store
- The cashier has limited view of the store
- The person may wait unseen at site B for the best opportunity to strike
- The person has a good view of the store entrance
- A robbery at site C is unseen from outside due to the windows being obstructed by shelving and posters
- The robbery is hidden from view and the person feels more confident
- There is also an increased risk of shoplifting at site B

C

B

Cold
store

A

Cash register

Window

Example of a well designed store

- Clear windows with few posters and no shelving improve visibility into and out of the store
- Improved lighting increases visibility into the store
- The cash register positioned close to the door at site C allows staff to see persons enter and leave the store at site A
- The cash register is raised to improve visibility within the store
- Improved shelving layout ensures site B is now visible to cashier
- Use of mirrors ensures staff can see the entire store
- CCTV installed acts as a deterrent and aids in identification if a robbery occurs

Cold store

B

C

A

Cash register

CCTV

Mirror

Window

Appendix 3:
CPTED Checklist

CPTED checklist for on- and club-licensed premises	Yes	No	N/A
Bar area			
Bar staff have good visibility of entire premises			
Area behind the bar is raised to improve visibility			
Bar area is open with no obstructions affecting monitoring of premises			
Cash registers are front facing			
If cash registers are not front facing, mirrors are installed for monitoring customers			
Safe is out of public view			
Internal layout			
Premises is laid out so staff can monitor all patrons at all times			
There are no obstructions within the bar causing blind spots			
Where there may be blind spots, mirrors or CCTV are installed			
Bar is easily approached by customers			
Customers can easily move around the premises			
Sufficient seating is provided			
Customers cannot climb on structures or fittings			
Crowding			
The premises are not overcrowded			
The maximum number of patrons for the premises is displayed and complied with			
Lighting			
Internal lighting is suitable			
Lighting allows door staff to check IDs etc.			
Lighting allows staff to monitor patrons inside the premises			
No areas are too dark inside the premises			
Internal lighting can be raised in an emergency or incident and at closing time			
External lighting is suitable			
External security lighting is installed			
Ventilation			
A ventilation system is installed			
The premises are maintained at a suitable temperature			

CPTED checklist for on- and club-licensed premises (continued)	Yes	No	N/A
Outdoor drinking areas			
Outdoor drinking areas are monitored by bar and/or security staff			
Lighting allows staff to monitor patrons			
Customers can move easily around the outdoor drinking areas			
Outdoor drinking areas are well defined from surrounding external environment			
Pavement creep is not evident			
Outdoor drinking areas are not overcrowded			
A street trading licence or equivalent is held and is current			
CCTV			
CCTV is installed			
CCTV is positioned to monitor vulnerable areas			
Patrons are aware of the CCTV system			
Staff understand its operation			
Entrances and exits			
Entrances and exits are visible from behind the bar area			
CCTV is installed to monitor blind entrances and exits			
Door staff monitor entrances and exits			
Where queuing occurs outsides the premises, there is sufficient space			
Toilets			
Toilet facility entrances are visible from the bar area			
Toilets are inspected regularly			
Staff			
There are sufficient numbers of staff to ensure control of the premises			
Staff are visible to patrons			
Staff monitor the premises for conflict and crime			
Security staff are properly trained and certified			

CPTED checklist for off-licensed premises	Yes	No	N/A
Windows			
There is at least 50% transparency in the front of the premises			
There is good visibility to and from the premises and the street			
Lighting			
Internal lighting inside the premises is suitable			
Lighting allows customers to be seen as they enter the premises			
Lighting allows staff to check IDs etc.			
Lighting outside the premises is suitable			
Lighting outside the premises discourages loitering			
Car parks and loading bays are well lit			
Street lighting is outside the premises is working properly			
Internal layout			
The cash register is positioned near the main entrance			
The cash register area is raised to improve visibly			
Safe is out of public view			
No stock displays are greater than 1.3m			
The entire premises can be seen by the cashier			
There is good visibility into cold stores			
Where there may be blind spots, mirrors or CCTV are installed			
Security			
Doors and windows are reinforced			
Nothing encourages loitering outside the premises (e.g. notice boards etc.)			
There are no recessed entrances to the premises			
Intruder alarm is installed			
Alarm is monitored by monitoring centre			
Panic buttons are linked to intruder alarm			
CCTV			
CCTV is installed			
CCTV is positioned to monitor vulnerable areas			
Customers are aware of the CCTV system			
Staff understand its operation			
Staff			
There are sufficient numbers of staff to ensure control of the premises			
Two or more workers are on duty after dark			
Staff are visible to customers upon entering the store			
Staff greet/acknowledge customers entering the store			
A door buzzer notifies staff of customers entering the store			

Appendix 4: Privacy and CCTV

A guide to the principles of the Privacy Act 1993

Principle 1: Deciding whether CCTV is right for you

Before you install CCTV, you need to make an informed decision about whether it is really necessary. This fits in with Principle 1 of the Privacy Act, which says that personal information shall not be collected unless:

- The information is collected for a lawful purpose connected with a function or activity, and
- The collection of the information is necessary for that purpose.

(Principles 10 and 11 also say you may only use and disclose personal information for the purpose that you collected it).

Principle 2: Have a clear plan

Develop a business plan for the CCTV system, setting out:

- The purpose of the system
- The outcome(s) that you expect
- The type of technology and equipment that will be used
- How the system will be operated, and
- How privacy impacts will be minimised.

Appoint a person to be responsible for the operation of the CCTV system; develop a clear policy on how images collected by CCTV will be handled; and train staff in your policies and procedures for the CCTV system.

Principle 3: Selecting and positioning cameras

Choose equipment which will achieve the purpose of your system in the most privacy friendly way. For example, position cameras in a way that will not intrude to an unreasonable extent on the privacy of individuals, e.g. do not position cameras in toilets, etc. You need to take privacy into account when you choose your equipment. Some types of systems have relatively little effect on privacy, and others are highly intrusive. The more privacy intrusive your system is, the more careful you will have to be with managing it. Where feasible, also use 'privacy enhancing technologies' i.e. technologies specifically designed to help to protect individuals' privacy and personal information. For example, encryption protects personal information from being seen by others who are not the intended owners of the information, such as CCTV images stored on your system.

Principle 4: Make people aware of the CCTV

Under Principle 4 of the Privacy Act, you need to make individuals aware that you are collecting their personal information and why. Erect signs both near the CCTV cameras and at the perimeter of the CCTV system's range (before individuals enter the range of the cameras) to notify people that cameras are operating. The signs should make clear who owns and operates the CCTV system and contact details (if this information is not already obvious). Make sure there is a full privacy notice available on the premises to let the public know more about the operation of the CCTV cameras and ensure your staff can answer questions from the public about the system.

Principle 5: Collecting only necessary images

Collecting only necessary information can be a challenge with CCTV cameras, because you usually do not know when a particular incident of interest might happen. Ideally, limit the hours that the CCTV cameras operate to times where it is necessary (such as opening hours, or days and times during the week when crime peaks).

Principle 6: Using the CCTV images

Take reasonable steps to check CCTV images are accurate, complete, relevant and not misleading before you use them. Only use or disclose the images you collect with CCTV cameras for the original purpose you collected them. Do not publicly disclose images collected using CCTV unless you have the consent of the individual(s) shown in the footage or you have consulted the Police.

Principle 7: Storage and retention of images

Ensure that CCTV images are protected from loss and unauthorised access, use, modification and disclosure. Only keep CCTV images for a specified time. This time period must not be longer than is necessary to achieve your purpose. In other words, if you collected personal information for a particular purpose and that purpose has passed or you have finished using the information, you must delete or destroy it.

Principle 8: Controlling who can see the images

One of your obligations is to protect personal information from unauthorised access. This means protecting both stored CCTV footage and the area where monitoring of CCTV takes place. Ensure that the control or monitoring room is only accessible by authorised staff members. You must establish procedures for individuals to access images of themselves captured by your CCTV cameras. Establish procedures for when and how you disclose your CCTV images to the Police. Keep a log of all accesses to CCTV images by external parties.

Principle 9: Audit and evaluation

You should continue to evaluate the need for CCTV and how you are running it to ensure you continue to comply with the privacy principles. Audits and evaluations are a good business practice to ensure you are getting value from your investment, and ensure good information handling and identification of problems.

Collect statistics about your CCTV system to allow you to assess its strengths and weaknesses, e.g.

- The number of incidents captured by the cameras.
- The types of incidents recorded by the cameras.
- The time/days of the week when incidents occurred.
- At regular intervals evaluate the operation of the system to determine its effectiveness and continuing viability. Do regular audits of your equipment and procedures to ensure the system is operating smoothly. Check that your staff or CCTV operators are complying with your policies, and retrain as required.
- For more information, see the Privacy Commissioner's Privacy and CCTV – A Guide to the Privacy Act for Businesses, Agencies and Organisations, (2009), available at www.privacy.org.nz.

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